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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Humberto Pasquinal Ortiz appeals from the judgment entered upon the
jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant's
brief, p.1.)
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas
On the evening of January 31, 2007, Officer Jay Wiggins of the Twins
County Sheriffs Office observed people standing outside a known drug house.
(Trial Tr., p.82, L.23 - p.84, L.lO.) As Officer Wiggins passed the house, he saw
a vehicle back out of the driveway, and then exceed the posted speed limit on a
nearby street. (Trial Tr., p.84, L.2

- p.85, L.21.)

Officer Wiggins effectuated a

traffic stop. (Trial Tr., p.85, L.22 - p.86, L.2.) The registered owner and sole
occupant of the vehicle was identified as Humberto Ortiz. (Trial Tr., p.86, L.13

-

p.87, L.24.) Ortiz appeared to Officer Wiggins to be agitated, nervous, and was
visibly shaking. (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.13-17.) Ortiz was unable to provide proof of
insurance, so Officer Wiggins returned to his patrol vehicle to issue a citation.
(Trial Tr., p.88, L.18 - p.89, L.3.) While at his vehicle, Officer Wiggins called for
Deputy Morgan Case, who is the sheriffs office's narcotics canine handler. (Trial
Tr., p.89, Ls.4-13.)
Deputy Case arrived, made contact with Ortiz, and observed that Ortiz' leg
was shaking. (Trial Tr., p.165, L.19

- p.166, L.6.)

Deputy Case deployed his

canine to sniff the air around Ortiz' vehicle, and the canine alerted on the front
passenger door. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.18 - p.168, L.19.) A subsequent search of

Ortiz revealed a lighter, more than $3,000 cash, and what officers believed to be
a methamphetamine pipe, with a white residue substance inside.
p.169, L.12

- p.170,

L.20; p.93, Ls.16-24; p.90, L.23

- p.91,

(Trial Tr.,

L.12.) A large

amount of a white crystal substance was visible on the floorboard of the front
passenger side of Ortiz' vehicle, within arm's length of where Ortiz had been
seated. (Trial Tr., p.201, L.12 - p.202, L.13.) A torn plastic bag and a vial were
also located in the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.117, Ls.8-17; p.207, Ls.12-17.) The
white crystal substance was collected, tested at the state lab, and identified as
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.18 - p.139, L.14.)
The substance received by the state lab also included some debris
collected from the floorboard of Ortiz' vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.134, L.25

- p.135,

L.3.) Rachel Cutler, the forensic scientist that tested the substance, was unable
to easily separate the debris from the methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr.,
p.142, Ls.13-16.) Cutler reasoned that since the weight of the methamphetamine
would not amount to a trafficking quantity, and since the amount of the debris
was "not substantial enough to greatly affect" the total weight, that it was
unnecessary to separate the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.16-23.) Cutler did
indicate that the controlled substance "definitely" outweighed the debris, and that
in her opinion, the debris would be insignificant to the total weight of the
substance. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24- p.143, L.6; p.149, L.17- p.150, L.7.) The
total weight of the crystals and debris, before a sample of crystals was taken for
testing, was 3.82 grams. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.) After a small amount of the

methamphetamine was consumed for testing, the total weight of the crystals and
debris was 3.71 grams. (Trial Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.140, L.3.)
In order to establish Ortiz' knowledge of the presence of the
methamphetamine, educate the jury about the drug culture, and to rebut any
inference that the methamphetamine in Ortiz' car may have been spilled or
placed

there

accidently,

the

state

presented

evidence

of

typical

methamphetamine use and value. (Trial Tr., p.211, L.10 - p.212, L.9.) Officer
Kenneth Mencl testified that that the smallest one-hit type of dosage of
methamphetamine that is commonly sold on the street was "anywhere between
an eighth and a quarter of a gram," and that a gram would sell for approximately
$100. (Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215, L.4.) He also testified more generally about
typical methamphetamine use. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.5-21.)
The defense objected to this testimony, on the grounds that it would be
"more prejudicial than probative." (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.9-14.) Defense counsel
appeared to argue that since the precise amount of methamphetamine found in
Ortiz' car was unknown, and since even a trace amount of methamphetamine
would be a sufficient quantity under the possession charge Ortiz faced, then
general testimony regarding methamphetamine use and amounts should not be
admitted.

(Trial Tr., p.210, L.9 - p.211, L.9; p.212, Ls.'tl-24.)

The judge

overruled the objection and allowed the testimony, ruling that the evidence was
relevant, and "not unduly prejudicial" in violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.
(Trial Tr., p.213, Ls.4-20.)

Ortiz was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine, and

I

1

pled guilty to a second-offense enhancement. (Trial Tr., p.279, L.21 - p.280, L.7;
p.281, L.13

-

p.283, L.lO.) Ortiz filed a timely appeal from his judgment of

conviction (R., pp. 189-193, 200-202).

I
1
I

ISSUES
Oritz states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err allowing the State to introduce
testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use,
packaging, and sales, because this testimony was more
prejudicial than it was probative?

2.

Did the State violate Mr. Ortiz' right to a fair trial, but
committing prosecutorial misconduct during closing
arguments when he misrepresented Ms. Cutler's testimony?

3.

Did the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence and the
prosecutor's misconduct result in cumulative error depriving
Mr. Ortiz of a fair trial?

(Appellant's brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Ortiz failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that the probative value of evidence regarding typical
methamphetamine use was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice?

2.

Has Ortiz failed to show prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecutor's
factually accurate summary of the evidence presented at trial, or the
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence?

3.

Has Ortiz failed to show cumulative error?

ARGUMENT
I.
Ortiz Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishinq Thai The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Admittinq Evidence Of Typical Methamphetamine Use
At Trial
A.

Introduction
During trial, the district court permitted the state to present testimony of

Officer Menci, who testified about the typical use amounts and monetary value of
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.14 - p.214, L.13.) Ortiz objected to this
evidence at trial, arguing that pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the risk of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed the evidence's probative value. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.14 p.212, L.24.) The district judge overruled the objection, and Ortiz challenges this
ruling on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p.1.) Ortiz has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 is a discretionary matter that will
be disturbed on appeal only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court
abused its discretion. State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624
(1991); State v. Birkla, 126 ldaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43,45 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The District Court Utilized The Proper Standard
Ortiz first contends that the district court failed to apply the proper legal

standard to its determination in overruling the defense counsel's objection.
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) Ortiz objected to the evidence at trial on the grounds
"that it is more prejudicial than it is probative..." (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.12-14.)
Upon overruling Ortiz' objection, the district judge stated, "Of course it's
prejudicial, but I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." On appeal,
Ortiz contends that because the appropriate test under I.R.E. 403 is not whether
prejudicial evidence is "unduly prejudicial," but whether the risk of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence, the district judge
utilized the wrong standard. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Ortiz makes a distinction
without a difference.
While Ortiz correctly recites I.R.E. 403, he has not shown that the district
court relied on an improper legal standard. Ortiz' argument relies entirely on the
fact that the district judge did not recite I.R.E. 403 verbatim, but instead merely
referenced the rule, stating, in part, "...I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial
under Rule 403." (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls. 18-10.) Ortiz apparently contends that the
district judge utilized an improper "unduly prejudicial" test, and not I.R.E. 403,
despite the fact that the judge specifically cited I.R.E. 403. The more plausible
interpretation is that the district judge simply described evidence whose probative
value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice (I.R.E. 403
standard) as "unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." Ortiz has failed to show any

other support for his contention in the record, and has thus failed to show that the
district judge used an improper standard
D.

The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion In Determining That
The Probative Value Of The Evidence Was Not Substantiallv Outweiahed
By The Danaer Of Unfair Preiudice
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the

district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Flovd, 125 ldaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d
905, 907 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 ldaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343,
348 (Ct. App. 1993). As previously explained by this Court:
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant
evidence.
State v. Martin, 118 ldaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990)
(emphasis in original).
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case.

See

State v.

m,116 ldaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is
demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that
is unfairly prejudicial

- that

is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an

improper basis. Floyd,125 ldaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908.

The evidence challenged by Ortiz, however, does not tend to suggest a
decision on an improper basis, and Ortiz has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion.

Ortiz argues that since the precise weight of the

methamphetamine found in Ortiz' vehicle was unknown, then evidence regarding
typical methamphetamine use amounts and costs is improper under I.R.E. 403,
because such evidence would tend to improperly suggest to the jury that the
weight of the substance found in Ortiz' car (which included some amount of
debris) was actually the precise weight of the methamphetamine. (Appellant's
brief, pp.10-I I .) This argument is not supported by the record or logic
Ortiz appears to contend that the probative value of this evidence was
limited because Ortiz was not charged with delivery, attempted delivery,
trafficking, or another charge where weight and distribution would be a specific
element of the crime. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) However, this view discounts the
significant probative value of the evidence to the charge Ortiz actually faced
The prosecutor explained the probative value of this evidence at trial, outside of
the presence of the jury, while responding to Ortiz' objection to the evidence:
Your Honor, it [the evidence] is to rebut the inference that the
defense has, I think, indicated that this goes to whether or not Mr.
Ortiz knew of the presence of the methamphetamine. And this
evidence is to rebut any inference that a person who may have
placed it there wouldn't have placed that amount of
methamphetamine accidently. This is not a situation where
someone accidently spills a trace amount doesn't realize that they
spilled that.
This, I think, goes to whether or not it would be reasonable for
anyone else to have placed that and have lost that amount of
methamphetamine without realizing that. . . they had lost that or to
have actually intentionally placed it in that particular vehicle. It just
doesn't make any sense.

But the jury, where they really don't know anything about the drug
culture, they are not going to understand the significance of that
amount of methamphetamine found on that floorboard. So I think
that it is relevant to show that no reasonable person would have
accidently or intentionally have left it there for someone else to
have been in the situation like Mr. Ortiz is claiming.
(Trial Tr., p.211, L.12 - p.212, L.9.)
Indeed, Officer Mencl's testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use
and value was significantly probative in that it provided context for the
significance of various amounts of methamphetamine. Even taking the most
conservative view of the evidence, the probative value of the evidence is clear
and substantial.

Before testing, the methamphetamine crystals plus debris

weighed 3.82 grams.

(Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.)

Cutler testified that the

methamphetamine "definitely" outweighed the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24

-

p.143, L.6.) Even ignoring the other evidence regarding the insignificance of the
debris relative to the methamphetamine, if the methamphetamine outweighed the
debris at all, it would weigh at least 1.92 grams (just over one-half of the pre-test
methamphetamine plus debris weight of 3.82 grams).
According

to

Officer

Mencl's

general

testimony

regarding

methamphetamine use and value, such an amount of methamphetamine would
have a street value of approximately $192, and would constitute between
approximately 7.5 and 15 one-hit dosages.
L.4.)

(See Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215,

As the prosecutor noted, this was not a "trace amount" of

methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.21 I,Ls.18-20.) And as Ortiz points out, the
Idaho Court of Appeals has stated that "[tjhe greater the amount of a controlled

substance found in a defendant's possession, the greater the inference of
knowledge and control." State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225
(Ct. App. 1999); (Appellant's brief, p.10.)
Ortiz has stated no authority that would require the precise weight of a
controlled substance to be known in order for this inference from Grace to take
effect.

Surely, the amount of methamphetamine found on the floorboard of

Ortiz's vehicle creates more of an inference of possession under Grace then
would a smaller amount, for example, a trace amount of minimal value found in
the vehicle, even if evidence of the two amounts was something other than a
precise weight measurement.
At best, Ortiz is pointing out the potential weakness of the evidence
regarding typical methamphetamine use to the state's case, and making a jury
argument on appeal. It was clear from the evidence that the precise weight of
the methamphetamine was unknown. Cutler testified that the weight of the
substance found in Ortiz' car included some debris. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.4-17.)
She testified that she could not easily separate the debris from the
methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.13-23.) It is unclear how, as
Ortiz appears to claim, evidence regarding typical methamphetamine use might
unfairly confuse the jury into disregarding the presence of this debris.
Though the precise weight of the methamphetamine was unknown, other
testimony provided evidence of the relative amount of methamphetamine vs.
debris.

Cutler testified that the "controlled substance outweighed the debris

definitely" (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.8-17; p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.6), and that the debris

was "not substantial enough to greatly affect" the total weight. (Trial Tr., p.142,
Ls.21-23.) She also answered affirmatively to the state's question regarding
whether the debris in the substance was insignificant. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.)
Also, the actual substance of methamphetamine and debris was admitted as
evidence. (TrialTr.,p.141, L.15-p.142, L.9.)
Thus, while the state could not offer evidence of the precise weight of the
methamphetamine, it could and did offer other evidence regarding its amount.
Balancing this evidence is the province of the jury. Evidence is rarely so precise
to the degree of a specific scientific measurement. Such precision is not a
prerequisite to the admission of evidence at trial, nor does lack of such precision
condemn evidence to inadmissibility pursuant to I.R.E. 403. One of the very
purposes of a jury is to determine the facts in a trial, even when the evidence of
those facts may be imprecise, or even contradictory. This jury was presented
evidence regarding the weight of the substance containing methamphetamine
and debris, the relative amount of methamphetamine vs. debris, and the typical
use amounts and monetary costs of methamphetamine.

Officer Mencl's

testimony regarding the latter was not unfairly prejudicial.
Notably, Officer Mencl's testimony did not include opinions as to the value
and significance of the methamphetamine and debris actually found in Ortiz'
vehicle, and therefore did not tend to suggest the existence of a specific known
weight and value of the methamphetamine found.

Because Officer Mencl

testified only generally about methamphetamine use and amounts, he made no
such suggestion. Officer Mencl merely provided a potential tool for evaluation of

other evidence. It was up to the jury to determine, based on this evidence, how
or if to utilize this tool.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Mencl's
testimony regarding typical methamphetamine use and cost.

Ortiz has not

shown a risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence, let alone a risk that would
outweigh its clear and substantial probative value.
11.
Ortiz Has Failed To Establish Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In Relation
To Any Of The Prosecutor's Comments Durina Closina Araument
A.

Introduction
Ortiz claims that a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument, which was

not objected to, misrepresented the evidence, and constituted prosecutorial
misconduct amounting to fundamental error and a deprivation of his due process
rights. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-17.) A review of the record, however, shows
that the prosecutor's arguments did not misrepresent the evidence, and that in
making inferences from the facts presented at trial, the prosecutor did nothing
contrary to what he was entitled to do. Ortiz has thus failed to establish error,
much less fundamental error, in relation to the prosecutor's closing argument.

B.

Standard Of Review
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-

Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere

assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court: "[ljt is not enough that the prosecutors'
remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[Tlhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.")

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Evidence
The Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur

where the prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence." Darden, 477
U.S. at 181-82. However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on
the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or
conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined
whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United States
v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider the probable
effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to judge the
evidence fairly." Id. at 11-12.
Consistent with Darden and Young, the Idaho Supreme Court has held
that a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the

conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. State v.
Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999). Misconduct by a
prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged misconduct is so egregious or
inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was not, or could not have been,
remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that it should be
disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786, 948 P.2d 127, 140-141
(1997); State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State v.
Missamore, 114 ldaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Ames, 109
ldaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985). With respect to prosecutorial conduct
in the context of closing argument the Supreme Court has stated:
The 'consistent and repeated misrepresentation' of a dramatic
exhibit in evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a
significant impact on the jury's deliberations. Isolated passages of
a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to the jury as a matter of
opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same proportions. Such
arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom
carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation
frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than
crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify
prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not
lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less
damaging interpretations.
Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974)
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing a prosecutor's conduct in trial in light of its improvisational nature,
noting that "in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate
court] must keep in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571,
165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 ldaho 423, 427-28, 725

P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)). The ldaho Court of Appeals has further recognized
"[tjhe right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but
a fair one," and the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor
for misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991). Applying the foregoing standards to Ortiz' claims of
prosecutorial misconduct reveals that these claims are without merit.
Ortiz contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence during his
closing argument when he said, "[als the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that
debris, as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was insignificant. And
so this basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight
full of methamphetamine." (Appellant's brief. p.14, (quoting Trial Tr., p.253, L.25

- p.254, L.4).)

These arguments from the prosecutor, however, simply re-state

the facts of the case, and discuss reasonable inferences from the facts presented
at trial.
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct.
App. 2007) (citing Herrincl v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose
"is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the
evidence." Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002,
1007 (Ct. App. 1991)). Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their

respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003).
Ortiz first contends that prosecutor's statement, "[als. . . Rachel Cutler told
you, that debris, as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was
insignificant," misstates the evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) The state's
redirect examination of Cutler, from which the prosecutor's statement arose, was
as follows:
Now you said that you made some notes and
[THE STATE]:
at the time that you looked at the substance, that as far as the
debris was concerned, it was of an insignificant weight as far as
what you could see in that substance when you first opened up the
envelope, correct?

I just noted that I didn't feel the debris
[RACHEL CUTLER]:
was substantially affecting my total weight.
Okay. And you have had a chance now today
[THE STATE]:
to relook at that baggy and it's a total weight of 3.71, correct?
[RACHEL CUTLER]:

Yes, now

Is it still your opinion that whatever debris that
[THE STATE]:
there was contained in that baggy would be insignificant?
[RACHEL CUTLER]:

Yes

Cutler specifically stated that she didn't feel that the debris was
substantially affecting the total weight. She indicated that she had a chance, the
day of trial, to again look at the baggy containing the methamphetamine and
debris. It is in this context, following these questions about the total weight of the
methamphetamine with debris, that Cutler answered affirmatively when the
prosecutor asked whether the weight of the debris was "insignificant." Cutler was

thus clearly referring to weight of the debris "towards the total weight" of the
methamphetamine, just as the prosecutor had stated in closing argument.
Ortiz notes on appeal that, "taken in context with her earlier statements,
Ms. Cutler's statement that the debris was insignificant is not a statement that the
weight is such a miniscule amount it is insignificant, but that whatever the weight
is, it is not significant to her results in this case." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) That
Ortiz draws a different inference from the evidence does not show error,
however.
Second, Ortiz argues that the prosecutor's statement, "[alnd so this
basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of
methamphetamine", misstated the evidence because Cutler never testified about
the weight of the methamphetamine by itself, and that, in fact, explained that it
was too time consuming to separate the crystals from the debris, and that she
could not guess what percentage of the substance was methamphetamine.
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)
While it is correct that there was no evidence at trial pertaining to the exact
weight of the methamphetamine independent of the debris, Ortiz had not cited
authority nor provided argument as to why it is prosecutorial misconduct for a
prosecutor to make a qualified and reasonable inference regarding a weight
measurement at closing argument, when the precise weight of a substance is
unknown. Ortiz has not shown why weights or measurements should be treated
differently from any other type of evidence, from which prosecutors may draw
reasonable inferences in closing argument.

The prosecutor did not state, as a fact, that the methamphetamine
weighed exactly three and a half grams. Nor did he state that the Mr. Cutler
testified as to an exact weight of the methamphetamine. Instead, he carefully
qualified this inference as just that, an inference: "and so this basically was in the
neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of methamphetamine."
(Trial Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.) The words "basically" and "in the
neighborhood" indicate an uncertainty, an approximation, and an unavailability of
an exact measurement.

The fact that the

precise weight

of the

methamphetamine was unknown did not preclude the prosecutor from properly
making

any

reasonable

inferences

regarding

the

weight

of

the

methamphetamine. The fact that only a trace amount of methamphetamine was
sufficient for conviction in this case did not preclude the prosecutor from properly
making any argument that the actual weight of the methamphetamine was
something more than a trace.
The prosecutor's summary of the weight of the methamphetamine was in
fact, well supported by the evidence:
0

Cutler testified that the "controlled substance outweighed the debris
definitely." (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.8-17; p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.6.)
Cutler testified that the debris was "not substantial enough to greatly
affect" the total weight." (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.21-23.)

0

Cutler answered affirmatively to the state's question regarding whether
the debris in the substance was insignificant. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.)

The actual baggy, with methamphetamine crystals plus debris, was
admitted as evidence, which allowed a visual approximation regarding the
quantity of debris v. methamphetamine crystals. (Trial Tr., p.73, Ls.6-19;
p.141, L.15

- p.142,

L.1.) The state presented evidence regarding the

visual appearance of methamphetamine crystals, and of the nature of
some of the debris. (Trial Tr., p.100, L.25 - p.101, L.15; p.142, Ls.15-23.)
In addition, prior to deliberation, the jury was properly reminded that the
lawyers in the case are not witnesses, and what they say in their closing
arguments is not evidence. (Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.9-15.) The jury was further
cautioned that if the facts as they remembered them differed from the way the
lawyers have stated them, that they should follow their memory. (Trial Tr., p.243,
Ls.13-15.)

The prosecutor did not encourage the jury to disregard these

instructions. He simply summarized the facts from trial and drew reasonable
inferences therefrom.
To prevail on appeal, Ortiz must demonstrate that the comments he
complains of were so egregious or inflammatory that they could not have been
cured by an instruction. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969. Ortiz has
failed to show that the prosecutor's closing argument was all improper, much less
that it was so egregious and inflammatory as to be incurable by jury instruction.
111.
There Is No Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate

to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v.
w n s , 131 ldaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Ortiz has failed to show
that any errors occurred in his trial, let alone more than one, and therefore the
doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 115,
121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been
shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require
reversal. State v. Gray, 129 ldaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Barcella, 135 ldaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000)
(accumulation of errors deemed harmless)
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ortiz's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 1 l t h day of May 2009.
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